Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Marilyn J. Durfee v. Frank W. Durfee : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Respondent.
J. Franklin Allred; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Marilyn J. Durfee v. Frank W. Durfee, No. 890221 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1785

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A"»0
DOCKET NO.

W-tU

CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARILYN J. DURFEE (WOLF)
Plaintiff/Respondent

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.

CASE NO.

890221 - CA

FRANK W. DURFEE,

PRIORITY NO.

14

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from a final Judgment and Order entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Honorable Pat Brian

EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Respondent
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant

fn-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARILYN J. DURFEE (WOLF)

*
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Respondent

*

vs.

*

CASE NO.

FRANK W. DURFEE,

*

PRIORITY NO.

Defendant/Appellant.

890221 - CA
14

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from a final Judgment and Order entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Honorable Pat Brian

EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Respondent
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant

CONTENTS

Statement of Issues
1. Did the court appropriately find that there had been a
material change of circumstances not contemplated in the
original decree of divorce?
2. Did the court appropriately apply the support guidelines
then in effect at the time of trial from which this appeal is
taken?
3. Was the court entitled to take judicial notice of the impact
of a child's increased age on the amount of support awarded?
Statement of Facts
Summary of Argument
Point 1
The court appropriately found that there had been a material
change of circumstances not contemplated in the original
decree of divorce
Point II
The court appropriately applied the support guidelines in
effect at the time of trial
Point III
The court was entitled to take judicial notice of the impact of a
child's increased age on the amount of support awarded, and
even if such were error, it is harmless due to the availability
of supportive uncontested evidence
Commentary on Appellant's Brief
Conclusions

1
1
1
1
1
3
4
4
6
6
11

11
15
18

AUTHORITIES
Coleman v. Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983)
Craven v. Craven. 229 P.2d 301 (Utah 1951)
Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980)
Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983)
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985)
Wiker v. Wiker. 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978)
Wright v Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978),
Wvman v. Wallace. 615 P.2d 452 (Washington 1980)

ii

17
14
4, 5
5, 16
5, 16
16
14
12

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the court appropriately find that there had been a material

change of circumstances not contemplated in the original decree of
divorce?
2.

Did the court appropriately apply the support guidelines then

in effect at the time of trial from which this appeal is taken?
3.

Was the court entitled to take judicial notice of the impact of a

child's increased age on the amount of support awarded?
STATEMENT O F FACTS

The parties were divorced in 1978. (T. 62) The plaintiff/respondent
was awarded custody of the only two children of that marriage, Craig and
Chris, both boys who were respectively two and six years old at that time.
(T. 62-63 )From that time to the present both children remained in the
plaintiffs custody. (T. 63) The older boy, Craig has spent the school year
with his maternal Grandparents and spends summers with his mother, the
plaintiff/respondent. (T. 42, 64-65) In the ensuing years following the
divorce in 1978, expenses for support of the two boys have increased.
Their respective ages are now 12

and 16. Increased expenses of

support include clothing, food, school activities and medical expenses. (T.
67) The plaintiff/respondent has had to pay over $300 for orthodontic care
as a down payment, and an additional $74 per month. (T. 68-69) The
defendant/appellant was required under the terms of the original decree of
divorce to pay $150 per month for the support of each child. That sum,
according to uncontradicted testimony given by the plaintiff/respondent, is
turned over in its entirety to Craig's grandmother by mail, with whom he
spends the school year. (T. 72) The plaintiff/respondent further gave
uncontradicted and uncontroverted testimony that the cost of supporting

Chris was at the time of trial $500 per month, and the cost of supporting
Craig was $600 per month. In responding to evidence elicited by counsel
for the appellant, which attempted to allocate a fixed dollar amount for
raising the subject children (T. 75-84), the court stated:
The court can take judicial notice that once a kid
reaches his teenage years, he is more expensive to
rear than when he is a toddler. Anybody that's
had teenage kids knows that. This court has had
six of them. It will take judicial notice of that
fact.
(T. 84) Importantly, counsel for appellant did not object to the court's
taking judicial notice of increased expense in rearing teenagers versus
toddlers.
The appellant/respondent attempted to skew the calculations solicited
by the court based upon the then valid support guidelines by using a figure
of four children when in fact all he had were both of the children in
question and a third child by his second marriage. (T. 107) The 'fourth'
child was a

child voluntarily raised by the defendant/appellant.

With reference to its including a totality of criteria in its findings
and conclusions, the court stated:
[T]he court, in its analysis today, has focused on
bottom-line figures, understanding that if the cost
of living has gone up in the defendant's
household, and thus his disposable income may be
the same or less, that cost of living has gone up in
a corresponding manner in the plaintiffs
household, and the disposable income would
probably be subject to the same criteria.
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(T. 108) The court then went on to indicate that the defendant had
experienced a material, substantial change of circumstances since the 1978
divorce decree was entered. The court further found that the
plaintiff/respondent was at the time of modification rearing two boys who
were ten years older than at the time of the original decree, and that the
defendant was making approximately $29,000 in 1978 and made about
$45,000 at the time of modification. That was found to be an average
increase of about $1,600 per year. Furthermore, the court had no reason
to believe that it would not continue to so rise in the future. The court then
concluded that a modification was justified, and that the amount of increase
to be paid by the defendant would be calculated by the guidelines.

SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T

Proceedings calling for the modification of divorce decrees granting
child support, pursuant to the continuing jurisdiction of Utah courts in such
matters, are proceedings in equity. As such, the trial court has liberal
discretion and its findings and conclusions will be disturbed only upon a
clear showing of abuse of discretion on appeal. In the present appeal, the
appellant has failed to make such a showing.
The court below

need only find one material change to justify

the modification of a support award, but in fact found two. First, the court
found that the annual income of the defendant rose at an average rate of
$1,600 per year, while the plaintiff/respondent was unemployed. (T. 108)
Second, the court found that, as a matter of judicial notice, both of the
children of the marriage had grown from toddlers to teenagers, and with
that change in age came an increase in costs associated with support. If on
appeal, either of these is found to be a material change of circumstances,
3

then the failure of the other to be so termed is not fatal to
plaintiff/respondent's cause, since such is not prejudicial error; there was
under that circumstance the necessary material change of circumstances.
Once there has been a material change found, the court continues to
exercise a broad and liberal discretion in determining what level of support
is appropriate. The court below elected to set the support amount for
Chris and Craig at that level established by the uniform guidelines.
Having found a material change of circumstances not contemplated
in the Decree at the time of the original decree, the court properly
modified the amount of child support paid by the defendant/appellant.
Such is consistent with the laws of this state, and there is, in this course of
actions, no abuse of the court's equitable discretion.
POINT I
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY FOUND THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MATERIAL
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES NOT CONTEMPLATED IN THE ORIGINAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE

The appellant did not set forth the proper standard of review in
matters of equity in its brief. The appropriate standard was set forth in
Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme Court
stated:
"Under Utah law, a divorce court sits as a court in
equity so far as child custody, support payments,
and the like are concerned, [citations omitted] It
likewise retains continuing jurisdiction over the
parties, and power to make equitable
redistribution or other modification of the
original decree as equity might dictate. In both
the formulation of the original decree and any
modifications thereof, the trial court is vested
4

with broad discretionary powers, which may be
disturbed by an appellate court only in the
presence of clear abuse thereof.
Despain at 1305-1306.
In order to exercise its discretionary powers of equity in modifying
support awarded in an original decree of divorce, the trial court must find
a material change of circumstance. In one of only two cases, the second of
which (Hunter) seems of dubious value for the purposes of these
proceedings, appellant correctly cites the rule of law governing the
modification of a decree of divorce:
On a petition for a modification of a divorce
decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a
showing of a material change of circumstances
occurring since the entry of the decree and not
contemplated in the decree itself.
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985) at 701, see also appellant's
brief at 14. The appellant, in the same spot in his brief, admits to a 2.7%
increase in the defendant's annual gross income, and states that "such a
modest increase in salary was not contemplated by the parties at the time of
the entry of the decree of divorce." (id-) hi making such a statement,
appellant misapplies the rule cited above from Stettler. The material
change required is not one that "was contemplated by the parties", but
rather is one not contemplated in the decree itself. Appellant has made no
reference to any provision of the decree contemplating whatsoever an
increase in appellant's salary or annual gross income. The appellant
therefore has failed to demonstrate that this 'modest' increase in gross
income was contemplated in the decree. Because the decree itself made no
provisions for altering the amount of child support awarded based upon
5

changes in the gross income of the appellant, such a change in income was
not contemplated in the decree itself. (See Appendix "A", Decree of
Divorce) Therefore, if the change is found to be material under the broad
discretion allocated to the trial court, and if that material change was not
contemplated in the decree itself, such a finding satisfies the threshold
requirement stated above. That is the case in this appeal. The court made
a finding that the change in income was material, and such was founded
upon evidence properly received. In light of no clear abuse of discretion,
the findings of the court should be upheld.
POINT II
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE SUPPORT GUIDELINES IN
EFFECT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.

The support guidelines in force at the time of the modification
represent a conscious effort at scientific fact finding as exercised by the bar
and the judiciary, assisted by sociological data. Judge Judith Billings, chair
of the Utah Child Support Task Force, referring to the guidelines stated:
[The guidelines] represent a major step forward in
providing predictable and uniform child support
awards statewide.
(As quoted in "News - Administrative Office of the Courts, p. 1) The
amount and quality of scientific evidence incorporated into the
development of the guidelines is significant. Prompted by concerns voiced
by the Board of District Judges, the Task Force was organized, and was
composed of judges, lawyers, legislators, economists, professors and
representatives of public interest groups. (See May 1988 guidelines, p. 1)
6

During a course of regular hearings, the Task Force heard testimony from
many parents during July 1987. The Task Force reviewed guidelines in
place in many other states. The report of the task force states that "recent
studies indicate that child support awards are critically deficient when
measured against the economic costs of child rearing." Qd.) A 1985 study
estimated that $27.5 billion in support would be due and owing in 1985,
while a Census Bureau study indicated that only 70% of support awards is
actually collected. The same study reported that the mean court-ordered
support obligation in 1985 was $199 per month for 1.8 children, while the
poverty standard was $273 per month for the same 1.8 children. Another
study indicated that an order for $191 per month for a child of a middle
income family is equivalent to 25% of the average expenditures on that
child. All of this data pointed to the need for the adoption of uniform
guidelines.
The Task Force proceeded in developing guidelines by referring to
those employed in other states and by analyzing three models employed in
formulating guidelines, the cost-sharing model, the income equalization
method, and the income shares model. Of the states which have adopted
guidelines within the last two years, over one half have followed the
income shares model, which attempts to fix an award which reflects the
same proportion of parental income following the divorce that they would
have received had there been no divorce. This approach has been favored
because it assumes in its formulas that both parents have an obligation to
support the child or children in question, and it bases the actual support
awarded on the relative income available to each parent. In order to
continue with this balances approach, the figures represented in the
schedules formulated assume that the custodial parent receives the tax
7

exemptions for the children, reducing proportionally the amount of
support paid by the non-custodial spouse. Such guidelines reflect serious
study of the subject and an analysis of the need of Utah children, while
keeping in mind the relative capacity of the parents to pay support. The
appellant argues that for the judge to adopt the recommendations of the
guidelines is reversible error, but fails to establish a clear abuse of
discretion.
In addressing existing orders, the Task Force made two principal
comments. First, that simply because the current support paid under an
existing decree of divorce is less than that called for in the guidelines, such
does not, of itself, constitute a material change of circumstances. Second,
that existing orders should be considered on a case by case basis, by
reviewing the totality of present circumstances at the time of modification
to avoid working an undue hardship on the parents. The reasons for the
first comments are obvious. The Task Force did not wish to create a flood
of modification hearings by the stroke of a pen, in adopting and
promulgating the guidelines. The reasons for the second are equally
obvious. The Task Force did not want members of the judiciary to apply
the guidelines to existing orders unless such was warranted by present
circumstances.
The totality of present circumstances referred to in the guidelines
cannot refer to a totality of aU circumstances, but only of those relevant to
the amount of support, if any, to be awarded. The legislature of this state,
which also contributed to the promulgation of the guidelines, has
established by statute certain criteria, each of which was appropriately
considered by the court. Because the court received and reviewed evidence
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on these points, it considered the "totality" of the "present circumstances."
The factors established by the legislature are:
1) The standard of living and situation of the
parties;
2) The relative wealth and income of the parties;
3) The ability of the obligor to earn;
4) The ability of the obligee to earn;
5) The need of the obligee:
6) The age of the parties;
7) The responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
(Taken from Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2); See also Ebbert v. Ebbert. 744
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987) at 1023) These factors were present before
the court as admitted evidence, and the court made specific findings on all
of them but that of the age of the parties, although that fact was apparent to
the court, and there is no factor of age which could be used to defeat the
court's findings in any case. The court, at T. 108 - 111 entered findings
which are encapsulated herein:
1) The plaintiff/respondent was at the time of
modification unemployed. [Although one might
argue that she could become income-producing in
the future, such is not only speculative, but moves
beyond the realm of present circumstances.]
2) The defendant/appellant had experienced a
material change of circumstances in that his
annual income had increased from about $29,000
in 1978 to about $45,000 at the time of the
modification, representing a rather constant trend
of increase amounting to an average of $1,600 per
year.
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3) The court found that the factors affecting
disposable or discretionary income in the
defendant/appellant's household were substantially
the same as those affecting the
plaintiff/respondent's household.
4) The court order the calculation of the amount
under the guidelines to be based upon a threechild calculation.!
Thus, the court considered specifically those relevant factors established by
the legislature. Importantly, the court used a three child calculation, since
it was not the legal responsibility of the defendant/appellant to support the
alleged fourth child. Thus, the court below made a thorough investigation
of the situation of the parties and the children, and modified the award
amount based upon its review of the totality of present circumstances.
Contrary to what appellant argues, discretionary income, considered alone,
is not proof of either hardship, or of a failure to consider this case on a
"case by case" basis in view of the totality of present circumstances.
Appellant should note that the guidelines specify that the court modifying
existing orders should consider the totality of present circumstances of the
parties and not only of the obligor. The court did so, finding that their
discretionary incomes were equally impacted by similar if not identical
external factors.
The court below, having found a material change of circumstances
by viewing the totality of present circumstances under the guidelines
1

Appellant claims that there should be a fourth child employed in the calculation.
However, this "child" is not a "child" as defined by appropriate statute and case law. The
appellant voluntarily assumedresponsibilityfor the support of this fourth "child". As
stated in Wright v. Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978), even stepchildren cannot defeat a
parents obligation to support a child pursuant to a decree of divorce, for "the undertaking to
support stepchildren does notrelievethe parent of his obligation to support his own natural
children." (Wright at 445)
10

themselves and the dictates of case law and statute, concluded that the
application of the guidelines to the present situation was appropriate. For
the judge below to have moved against the scientific evidence marshalled in
the formulation of the guidelines without some important reason not to
have followed the guidelines would indeed have constituted a clear abuse of
discretion. The fact that the court did follow the guidelines given the
evidence presented is likewise indicative of the court's proper
acknowledgement of the extensive data and fact-finding incorporated into
the guidelines.
Appellant urges an abuse of discretion due to the failure of the court
to base the award not upon the gross annual income of the appellant, but
upon the discretionary income of the appellant. Appellant fails to cite even
one case which applied discretionary income as the appropriate measure of
comparison between the parents in determining support awards.
Respondent has reviewed the available case law and has failed to find even
one case, which appellant could cite to support his argument. The
guidelines themselves specify the gross income is the appropriate measure
for a determination of an award pursuant to the guidelines. In so doing,
the judge acted in keeping with the mandates of the community as
represented on the Task Force and at its hearings, in conformity with case
law, and in conformity with the law of this state. Appellant's argument on
this point is without merit.
POINT III
THE COURT WAS ENTITLED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE IMPACT OF A
CHILD'S INCREASED AGE ON THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT AWARDED. AND
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EVEN IF SUCH WERE ERROR. IT IS HARMLESS DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF

SUPPORTIVE UNCONTESTED EVIDENCE.
In his brief, appellant misstates the appropriate test of law for
judicial notice according to the facts of the present case. Appellant cites the
legal test applicable to adjudicative facts, not the test for the judicial notice
of legislative facts. The fundamental difference between to the two is quite
simple: adjudicative facts refer to specifics, such as the location of Salt
Lake City, or of Sugarhouse, whereas Legislative facts refer to statistical
sorts of conclusion, such as a legislature or task force might make
following a series of hearings and studies on a particular subject, much like
the effort which went into the formulation of the support guidelines.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the propriety of judicially noticing a
legislative fact, we should note that the court did not base its determination
of a material change of circumstances exclusively on the judicially noticed
fact of the increased expense of supporting the children due to their growth
into teenagers, but based its finding of a material change upon the obvious
and substantial increase in the defendant's income as well. Taken
individually or separately, there was nevertheless a material change of
circumstances not contemplated in the decree of divorce itself.
A Washington case Wyman v. Wallace. 615 P.2d 452 (Washington
1980), explains the nature and role of judicially noticed legislative facts:
trial courts and appellate courts can take notice of
"legislative facts" ~ social, economic and
scientific facts that "simply supply premises in the
process of legal reasoning." [citations omitted]
Under this doctrine a court can take notice of
scholarly works, scientific studies, and social
12

facts, [citations omitted] This legislative fact
doctrine is expressly recognized by both the state
[Washington] and federal rules of evidence, in
establishing strict requirements for judicial notice
of "adjudicative facts", the state and federal rules
carefully ensure that their requirements will no_£
also restrict notice of "legislative facts".
Wyman at 454. Evidence of such legislative facts was before the court in
the form of the uniform guidelines, to which the court made frequent
reference and of which the court displayed a working knowledge. The
plaintiff/respondent now invites this court to look at the three children
guidelines as contained in Appendix "B". For each an every one of the
income levels displayed at the far left hand side of both columns of the
page, there are three corresponding figures, each of which refers to the age
of the child in question. The age groups are "0-6", "7-15" and "16-18". If
the court will direct its attention to each income entry on this page, it will
note that the amount of support for each income level increases as the
child's age increases from category to category. For example, If the
income amount were "3000", a child between the years of "0-6" would
receive $212, a child between the years of "7-15" would receive $258 and a
child between "16-18" would receive $300. The consistency of this trend,
together with the broad and substantial scientific, economic and
sociological base of the studies and fact-finding that went into the
formulation of the guidelines, supports the conclusion that the guidelines
are "legislative facts", appropriate subjects for judicial notice free of the
restraints of that called for when addressing adjudicative facts. The court
did not abuse its discretion in judicially noticing such facts.
Assuming, arguendo, that the court should have treated the fact of
increased support expense commensurate with increased age as an
13

"adjudicative fact", there is ample case law that supports the court's
findings on this subject. In Wright v Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978),
the Utah court stated:
We have previously held that such [material
changes] have occurred when there is an increase
in the father's ability to support his children, or
where the children grow older and require
additional support to properly maintain them.
Wright at 445, (citations omitted). In the case of Craven v. Craven. 229
P.2d 301 (Utah 1951) the court found the age of the child in question to be
a significant factor:
After a careful examination of the petition and the
evidence, we conclude that the modification of the
lower court must be sustained. In her petition the
respondent alleged (1) that me child of the parties
had grown from infancy to the age of five years
and four months with the result that he requires
"much more" food, clothing and medical care: (2)
that since the entry of the original decree in
April. 1945. the price of food, clothing, housing
accommodations and all other items which are
necessary for the proper care and support of the
child had "greatly increased".
Craven at 302, emphasis added. The court went on to confirm the
allegations mentioned above.
In addition to case law which supports the proposition that the cost of
supporting a child increases as the child's age increases, the
plaintiff/respondent offered uncontroverted testimony that such was the
actual case with reference to the subject children. As was mentioned in the
statement of facts, the costs of providing food, clothing, activities and
14

medical care to Chris and Craig have increased during the past ten years.
When asked if the boys ate more than they did as toddlers, the
plaintiff/respondent replied "definitely". (T. 67)
In arguing against the fact that, pursuant to the rules of evidence
governing judicial notice of adjudicative facts, the determination that the
expense of supporting children increases as they age is unreasonable,
respondent asserts that perhaps appellant has never dined regularly with a
teenager or perhaps never was one. As the court correctly found,
teenagers simply are more expensive to raise.
The court appropriately found this to be a proper subject of judicial
notice, as a "legislative fact", or in the alternative, as a "adjudicative fact",
and in any case, there was independent, uncontroverted evidence
supporting the finding independent of considerations of judicial notice.
COMMENTARY ON APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appellant raises points in his brief, irrelevant to the issues herein
raised and not supported by the evidence admitted below, to which
respondent objects as being offensive. At page 15 of his brief, appellant
states:
It may be that greater funds are generally
committed to older children, but it may also be
that those funds do not fall within the realm of
"reasonable and necessary", but fall within the
realm of discretionary, or helpful, and reflect a
refusal of the parent to require and encourage the
child to provide for itself and be a productive part
of the family unit. In addition, it is only the
current popular lax attitude of parents that does
not rigorously demand a contribution both in
15

services and economics to the maintenance of a
household and a living environment.
The custody of the children or the fitness of the plaintiff as their custodial
parent and mother was not at issue. There are no facts supporting such
accusations. Appellant did not assert at trial that respondent did not
adequately care for or instruct the children in family rules, or did not teach
the children to be "productive" members of the family unit. Such
moralization has no proper place in these proceedings.
The appellant failed, and has failed to make a material showing of
"undue hardship", and therefore his assertion that the application of the
guidelines was reversible error is unfounded and unsubstantiated by the
record or by appellant's brief. Appellant has the burden of marshalling all
of the facts to support his appeal, and has failed to do so.
In addition to bearing the burden of marshalling facts, the appellant
must bring forth applicable law to establish a standard of both review by
the appellate court and the standards by which the trial court was to
proceed below. Appellant has cited no standard of review and cited only
the Stettler case in establishing the rule that modification be granted upon
a showing of a material change of circumstances not contemplated in the
decree itself. The so-called "rule of theHunter case" is not only an
invention, but fails to state a workable rule of law that can be established
by this court. (See appellant's brief at 12, and Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d
430 (Utah 1983)) In direct contravention to the "rule of the Hunter case",
respondent cites Wiker v. Wiker. 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 1978) which states:
[N]o one has any vested rights in a support decree
which statutorily may be changed from time to
16

time by a court under its continuing jurisdiction
in such matters.
Wiker at 515. While there may be a general notion that a child has a right
to claim support from its parent, such is not the issue here. The issues is:
does a child, or anyone else, have a vested right to support which is
founded only upon the decree of divorce itself? The answer, as supplied in
Wiker. is "no". This does not mean that child support rights cannot flow
out from a decree of divorce, but simply means that such support rights in
the child are not found in the decree itself. As stated in Coleman v.
Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983):
Installments of support payments ordered in a
divorce decree become vested in the recipient
when the become due.
Coleman at 1157. In short, although the subject children have a general
right to support from their parents, they have no rights to such pursuant to
a decree of divorce. The general right of a child to support is independent
of a decree of divorce. It would be no excuse for a parent to raise that it
failed to support a child when it had the means to, simply because the other
parent, who was obligated under a decree of divorce to pay for the support
of the children, had failed to do so. The general right is independent of a
decree of divorce. In contrast, there are no vested rights to a fixed amount
of support pursuant to decree of divorce until the payment of such
becomes due, and then the right is one of collection of a past due debt, not
a right to support. Appellant is misguided when he argues that Craig can
enforce the decree of divorce, or that his grandparents may do so. The
decree is between the parties and can be enforced by them alone. Not only
did the defendant/appellant fail to request that the court require the
17

payment of support directly to the grandparents or to Craig himself, but
such would not be in harmony with the rules of law just stated.
CONCLUSIONS
The court appropriately found that there had been a material change
of circumstances not contemplated in the original decree of divorce.
According to the rules governing the modification of an award of support,
the court properly proceeded to modify the same. Furthermore, the court
properly elected to employ the uniform guidelines in formulating the
increase in support. The court had heard evidence as required by statute,
case law and the guidelines themselves, representing a totality of present
circumstances to the court. The court properly took judicial notice of the
fact that the cost of supporting children increases as they age. Such was a
societal fact, a legislative fact, not governed by the strict rules of judicial
notice of adjudicative facts. Even if the facts in question are found to be
adjudicative rather than legislative, they nevertheless met the legal test
supplied for adjudicative facts. Finally, the finding could be made, and
perhaps was made, independently, upon the testimony of the
plaintiff/respondent. As such, there was not error. The appellant has
failed to meet the burden of proving clear abuse of discretion, and as such
is not entitled to relief by this court.
Appellant, in failing to establish the appropriate standard of review
in his appeal, and in failing to marshall law supportive of his appeal, has
worked a hardship upon the plaintiff/respondent that has increased her
costs in this appeal. For this reason, plaintiff/respondent not only moves
that this appeal be vacated, but that she further receive the sum of $1500 in
reasonable costs and fees of appeal, incurred by the appellant's failure to
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carry the affirmative burdens of establishing the scope and nature of his
appeal, as required by case law.
Respectfully submitted this

h

^O
day of ifZ^Jrfaw'U'.

1989.

Jsm* M *-?miM'A*U^\.
iphraim H. Fankhauser /
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that if true and correct copies of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, this £
day of
{P&fafcu^.
1989 to:
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED

321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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MORRIS D. YOUNG
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South M a m Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: 882-1618
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.

^*
.1*^^

ooOoo
MARILYN J. DURFEE,
Plaintiff,

D E C R E E

vs.

OF

D I V O R C E

FRANK W. DURFEE,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 9429

ooOoo
This natter came on regularly for hearing before tie
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin on the 13th day of November, 1978.
The Stipulation of the parties was accepted and the default of
the defendant was entered.

More than three months ha^e expired

since the filing of the Complaint.

The Plaintiff appeared in

person and was represented by her attorney, Morris D. Young.
Pursuant to the foregoing and the Plaintiff having presented testimony in open court in support of her complaint and the Court
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
1.

That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing

between MARILYN J. DURFEE, Plaintiff, and FRANK W. DURFEE, Defendant, be and the same are hereby dissolved provided that this
decree shall not become final until three months from the date
of the filing of said decree during which time neither of the
parties are to remarry, which decree will become final without
further proceedings unless either of the parties hereto or the
Court on its motion institutes further proceedings herein.
2.

The care, custody, and control of the minor chil-

dren of the parties is awarded to the plaintiff subject to rights
of visitation at all reasonable times and Dlaces in tne defendant.

C***\ , A

(1)

3.

Defendant is required to pay plaintiff $150.00 per

month per child for the support of the two minor children of the
parties and $1.00 per year as alimony.
4.

Defendant is required to pay plaintiff $500.00 to

help her to secure reliable transportation to enable her to seek
employment and to go back and forth to work after she does obtain
employment.
5.

The home of the parties located at 310 South Cooley

Street, Grantsville, Utah, is to be sold and the following obligations of the parties are to be paid from the proceeds of the sale
of said real property:
a.

The balance owing to Morris D. Young as attorney

b.

Zions Mortgage Company, approximately $2 5,000.00.

c.

Rolfe Assay for the down payment, approximately

d.

Blazer Finance Company for the furniture of

fees.

$1,200.00.

the parties, approximately $1,800.00.
e.
6.

First Security Bank Visa Card, $500.00.

In addition, the following obligations of the defen-

dant are to be paid from the Droceeds of the sale of the real
property of the parties:
a.

Commercial Security Bank Mastercharge, $500.00.

b.

Commercial Security Bank Checkard, $500.00.

c.

Bryner Clinic, $20.00.

do

Dr. Kirk, $20.00.

e.

Salt Lake Clinic, about $100.00.

f.

Tooele Clinic, about $50.00.

g.

Dr. A. Jay DeLaMare, about $3 50.00.

h.

Any miscellaneous small bill or obligation that

may have been incurred as a family expense.
7.

Any remaining equity derived from the sale of the

home of the parties is to then be divided equally, half to each
of the parties herein.

Cw
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8.

Defendant is required to pay the following obligation

from his separate funds:
a.
9.

Laury Miller Pontiac, about $7,000.00.

The following personal property is awarded to the

plaintiff:
a.

Four rooms of miscellaneous furniture and house-

hold equipment including the portable air conditioner.
b.

Plaintiff's own personal belongings and effects.

c.

The personal belongings and effects of the

children of the parties.
10.

The following personal property is awarded to the

defendant:

11.

a.

1978 Pontiac automobile.

b.

Pool table and fish acquarium.

c.

The downstairs miscellaneous furniture.

d.

Miscellaneous guns and sporting equipment.

e.

Defendant's own personal belongings and effects.

Defendant is ordered to keep his health and accident

insurance in full force and effect and to maintain

the medical

coverage on the children of the parties.
12.

The state and federal income tax refunds that the

parties have coming are to be divided equally between the parties.
13.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against this defen-

dant in the sum of $300.00 for attorney fees and costs of court
incurred herein for the prosecution of this matter.
Dated this

Filed this

C Z "l •. 2*6

^—/

da

Y of November, 1978.

day of November, 1978.
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SS£&
Gross
Income ($)

0-50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000
1050
1100
1150
1200
1250
1300
1350
1400
1450
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
2000
2100
2200
2300
2400
2500
2600
2700
2800
2900
3000
These

5/12/88

State of Utah
Support Amount ($ per Child)
Age Group
~ ~
IC'TQ
0-6
7-15
16-18

7
13
18
23
27
31
34
36
39
42
44
47
50
52
55
59
63
68
72
76
80
84
87
91
95
99
103
107
111
114
118
122
126
129
133
136
138
141
143
146
151
156
163
170
177
184
191
198
205
212

8
15
21
27
33
37
41
44
48
51
55
58
62
65
69
74
79
84
89
93
98
103
107
112
117
121
126
131
135
140
144
149
153
158
162
165
168
172
175
178
185
191
199
208
216
225
233
241
250
258

9
17
24
31
38
43
47
52
56
61
65
69
73
77
82
88
93
99
104
110
115
121
126
131
137
142
147
153
158
163
168
173
178
184
188
192
196
200
204
208
216
224
233
243
253
262
272
281
291
300

C 0 bi e d
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Adjusted
Gross
Income ($)

3100
3200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
4000
4100
4200
4300
4400
4500
4600
4700
4800
4900
5000
5100
5200
5300
5400
5500
5600
5700
5800
5900
6000
6200
6400
6600
6800
7000
7200
7400
7600
7800
8000
8200
8400
8600
8800
9000
9200
9400
9600
9800
10000

Support Amount ($ per Child)
Age Group
0-6

219
226
233
239
246
253
260
266
273
278
284
290
296
302
309
315
322
328
335
341
347
354
360
367
373
379
386
392
398
405
417
430
442
455
467
479
492
504
516
528
540
552
564
578
591
604
616
628
640
652

7-15

16-18

266
274
282
290
299
307
315
323
330
337
344
351
358
366
374
382
389
397
405
412
420
428
435
443
451
458
466
473
481
488
503
518
533
548
563
577
592
607
621
636
650
664
679
694
710
725
740
754
768
782

310
319
329
338
347
356
366
375
384
392
400
408
417
425
434
443
452
461
470
479
488
496
505
514
523
531
540
549
557
566
583
600
618
635
651
668
685
702
719
735
752
768
785
803
821
838
854
870
887
903

schedule* are to be used with the Child Support Obligation Worksheet Award amounts have been adjusted to

ruipncv

